How to choose? Preferences, Utility and Stochastic Dominance

Sebastiano Vitali

Charles University, MFF Praha Does it ever happen that we need to make a choice?

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Every day

Do you run an optimization model to make your choice?

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Typically not...

But still, is your decision somehow rational?

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Hopefully...

When a choice is rational?



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We try to tackle these issues during this presentation

Risk vs Uncertainty

 Risk: situation where both possible outcomes and their probabilities are known (models)

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 Risk: situation where both possible outcomes and their probabilities are known (models)

 Uncertainty: situation either where possible outcomes or their probabilities are not known (life)

Economic agents are assumes to behave according to their preferences.

Two main relationships are used to describe preferences:

 "to be preferred to" (≥): when the payoffs represented by vector x are preferred to payoffs in vector y

$$x \succeq y$$

• "to be indifferent to" (\sim): when the payoffs represented by vector x are indifferent to payoffs in vector y

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Actually

$$x \succeq y \land y \succeq x \Rightarrow x \sim y \tag{1}$$

So we can just study the \succeq relation and the other is only a sub-case.

An economic agent is said to be rationale if her preferences are

• **complete**: an agent is always able to define her preferences when facing a choice (strong condition). This means that

$$\forall x, y \quad \text{either } x \succeq y \lor y \succeq x \lor x \sim y \text{ is true}$$
 (2)

• **transitive**: given three vectors x, y, z

$$x \succeq y \land y \succeq z \Rightarrow x \succeq z \tag{3}$$

• **continue**: given three vectors x, y, z

$$\forall x \succeq y \succeq z \Rightarrow \exists \lambda \in [0,1] : \lambda x + (1-\lambda)z \sim y \tag{4}$$

Theorem

If preferences are rational (complete and transitive), and continuous, then there exist a (continuous) function $U(\cdot)$ (so-called "utility function") such that

$$x \succeq y \Leftrightarrow U(x) \geq U(y)$$

Of course, the utility function is not unique. Any increasing function does not alter the inequality. For any $V(\cdot)$ increasing:

$$U(x) \ge U(y) \Leftrightarrow V(U(x)) \ge V(U(y))$$

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Utility functions are good for ordering, not for measuring!

Further properties for a reasonable utility function $U(\cdot)$. Utility is

• increasing: an agent always prefers more to less, i.e.

$$\frac{\partial U(x)}{\partial x} > 0 \tag{5}$$

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• concave: the marginal utility is decreasing

$$\frac{\partial^2 U(x)}{\partial x^2} < 0 \tag{6}$$

Preferences (with Risk)

Previous theorem is useful to study situation without risk. In presence of risk we need another assumption:

• **independence**: if an agent prefers x to y and must chose between two bundles (x, z) and (y, z) containing z in the same proportion, then she will chose (x, z).

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Expected utility can fail!!

But still, in most cases, we can say something useful with utilities. For instance we can interpret the **risk attitude** of an investor.

Assume there are two possible outcomes W_1 and W_2 having respectively utility $U(W_1)$ and $U(W_2)$. The expected utility lines on the straight line between the two points (see figure!), what about the utility of the combination between W_1 and W_2 ?

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The aversion can change with the wealth level, then we introduce the Arrow-Pratt (Relative) Risk Aversion:

$$RRA = -\frac{U''(W)W}{U'(W)}$$

Then, we can distinguish:

CARA Constant IARA Increasing

DARA Decreasing HARA Hyperbolic

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Then, fixing values for α , β and γ , we obtain all the classes.

CARA
$$\alpha=1$$
, $\gamma=0$

DARA
$$\alpha = 1 \ \gamma = 1$$

IARA
$$\gamma = -\beta$$

HARA any \rightarrow \rightarrow \rightarrow \rightarrow \rightarrow \rightarrow

Assume you invest 100 and you can get the following equiprobable realizations.

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First order dominance!

Second order dominance!

Given two distributions X and Y we define that X first-order stochastically dominates Y if

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In terms of cumulative functions F_X and F_Y

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If the random variables are discrete and taking n values each with probability 1/n: $\mathbf{X} \ge \mathbf{P} \cdot \mathbf{Y}$, where \mathbf{P} is a permutation matrix.

Second order Stochastic Dominance

Defining the twice cumulative distribution function as

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$$F_X^{(2)}(\eta) \le F_Y^{(2)}(\eta), \forall \eta \in \Re$$
 (15)

Moreover, X second-order stochastically dominates Y if and only if every expected utility maximizer with an nondecreasing and concave utility function prefers X over Y: $\mathbb{E}[U(X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[U(Y)], \forall U \in \mathcal{U}_2$, where \mathcal{U}_2 is the set of all nondecreasing and concave utility functions.

Second order Stochastic Dominance

Defining the twice cumulative distribution function as

$$F_X^{(2)}(\eta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\eta} F_X(\alpha) d\alpha \tag{14}$$

Given two distributions X and Y we define that X second-order stochastically dominates Y if

$$F_X^{(2)}(\eta) \le F_Y^{(2)}(\eta), \forall \eta \in \Re$$
 (15)

Moreover, X second-order stochastically dominates Y if and only if every expected utility maximizer with an nondecreasing and concave utility function prefers X over Y: $\mathbb{E}[U(X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[U(Y)], \forall U \in \mathcal{U}_2$, where \mathcal{U}_2 is the set of all nondecreasing and concave utility functions.

If the random variables are discrete and taking n values each with probability 1/n: $\mathbf{X} \ge \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{Y}$, where \mathbf{W} is a double stochastic matrix.

Conclusions

Observation



Observation

Reason

Observation

Reason



Observation

For daily life decisions you face uncertainty, not risk

Reason



Observation

For daily life decisions you face uncertainty, not risk

Reason

you **do not** know the probability

Observation For daily life decisions you face uncertainty, not risk

Reason you **do not** know the probability

Consequence use utility for preferences!!

Observation

For model decisions you face risk

Reason



Observation For model decisions you face risk

Reason you do know the probability

Observation For model decisions you face risk

Reason you **do** know the probability

Consequence use **expected** utility for preferences!!

Observation

The agent has some attitude

Reason



Observation The agent has some attitude

Reason risk-averse, risk-neutral, risk-lover, ...

Observation The agent has some attitude

Reason risk-averse, risk-neutral, risk-lover, ...

Consequence use **appropriate** utility function!!

Observation

To choose the utility function could be challenging

Reason



Observation

To choose the utility function could be challenging

Reason

each risk-attitude may have multiple utility functions

Observation To choose the utility function could be challenging

Reason each risk-attitude may have multiple utility functions

Consequence use stochastic dominance!!

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Děkuji moc

