Expansions of Pseudofinite Structures and Circuit and Proof Complexity

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I am honored to have a chance to contribute to this volume celebrating a personal anniversary of Albert Visser.

Abstract

I shall describe a general model-theoretic task to construct expansions of pseudofinite structures and discuss several examples of particular relevance to computational complexity. Then I will present one specific situation where finding a suitable expansion would imply that, assuming a one-way permutation exists, the computational class NP is not closed under complementation.

1 Task

Consider the following situation: \( M \) is a nonstandard model of true arithmetic (in the usual language of arithmetic \( 0, 1, +, \cdot, \leq \), \( n \) is a nonstandard element of \( M \), \( L \) is a finite language and \( W \in M \) is its interpretation on the universe \([n] = \{1, \ldots, n\} \); \( W \) can be identified with a subset of \([n^k]\) for some \( k \in \mathbb{N} \). We shall denote the resulting structure \( A_W \); it is coded by an element of \( M \) that is \( \leq 2^{nk} \). Without a loss of generality we shall assume that \( L \) contains constants \( 1, n \), the ordering relation \( \leq \) interpreted as in \( M \), and ternary relation symbols \( \oplus \) and \( \odot \) for the graphs of addition and multiplication inherited from \( M \). Because \( M \) is a model of true arithmetic \( A_W \) is pseudofinite: it satisfies the theory of all finite \( L \)-structures.

Paris and Dimitracopoulos [20] studied the problem of for how large \( m > n \) does the theory of the arithmetic structure on \([n]\) determine the theory of the arithmetic structure on \([m]\) and proved that it does not for \( m = 2^n \). They also pointed out various links between questions of this type and complexity theory problems around the collapse of the polynomial time hierarchy. Ajtai [1] showed (among other similar results) that if \( M \) is a countable nonstandard model of PA and \( L \) is finite then for any \( L \)-structure \( A_W \) there are two sets \( U, U' \subseteq [n] \), both elements of \( M \), such that \( M \) thinks that \(|U|\) is odd and \(|U'|\) is even while, as structures, \((A_W, U) \cong (A_W, U')\) (the isomorphism is not in \( M \), of course). Kraijček and Pudlák [18] showed (improving upon earlier results of Hájek [10] and Solovay [22]) that for any nonstandard \( t \leq n \in M \) one can construct \( M' \supseteq M \) containing a proof of contradiction in PA of length bounded by \( n^t \) without adding any new elements to interval \([0, n]\). Máté [19] considered the full second order structure on \([n]\) (coded in \( M \)) and reformulated the statement that \( NP \neq coNP \) as a statement about non-preservation of the theory of the structure in an expansion coming from a model \( M' \supseteq M \).

The most interesting results of this kind (to this author) were obtained initially by Ajtai [1, 2]. In the first paper he established that parity of \( n \) bits cannot be computed by \( AC^0 \) circuits (proved inde-
pendently by Furst, Saxe and Sipser \[8\]) and he reports there that his first proof of the lower bound was by model theory of arithmetic although he eventually chose to present the result combinatorially. In the second paper he proved that propositional formulas $PHP_m$ formalizing the pigeonhole principle do not have polynomial size constant depth Frege proofs. That proof is by constructing a suitable model of arithmetic.\footnote{The original manuscript was only about models of bounded arithmetic. After Ajtai learned that Paris and Wilkie \[21\] linked provability of PHP in bounded arithmetic with a conjecture of Cook and Reckhow \[6\] that formulas $PHP_m$ are hard for Frege systems, shown eventually false by Buss \[5\], he added a few handwritten pages showing how his result implies a lower bound for constant depth Frege systems.} We shall discuss these two examples in the next section.

In this, mostly expository, note we are interested in the general question of how to construct expansions of $A_{W}$ with particular properties. Before formulating this more specifically we will consider in the next section three examples. The examples go back to Ajtai \[1, 2\] and (essentially) Máté \[19\] but two of them are not presented in the literature with enough details and are formulated with unnecessarily strong hypotheses. In the subsequent section we shall discuss a specific open problem whose solution would have interesting implications for computational complexity.

The note is self-contained modulo a basic knowledge of logic and complexity theory. Notions not explained here can be likely found in \[13\].

### 2 Examples

**Parity example.** It is well-known that the parity of a string of bits cannot be computed by $AC^0$ circuits. \[1, 8\]. That is,

\[(1) \text{ For any } d \geq 1 \text{ and large enough } m, \text{ any depth } d, \text{ size } \leq m^d \text{ circuit with } m \text{ inputs must compute erroneously the parity of some } m\text{-bit string.}\]

Computability by $AC^0$ circuits is equivalent to first-order definability in the presence of an extra structure (of a fixed signature, the extra structure depending just on the size of the universe). In particular, \( (1) \) is equivalent to

\[(2) \text{ For any finite language } L \text{ and any formula } \Phi(X) \text{ in the language } L(X), \text{ } L \text{ augmented by a unary predicate } X(x), \text{ for } m \text{ large enough and any } L\text{-structure } B \text{ with universe } [m] \text{ it holds:}\]

- There is $U \subseteq [m]$ such that the equivalence:

  $$ (B, U) \models \Phi(U) \iff |U| \text{ is odd} $$

  fails.

Using overspill in $M$, \( (2) \) is equivalent to the same statement for any $L\text{-structure on any nonstandard } [n] \in M$ (with $U \in M$ and its parity defined in $M$). And that can be further formulated as follows.

For $u \in [n]$ denote $U^{<u} := \{ v \in U \mid v < u \}$ and $U^{\leq u} := \{ v \in U \mid v \leq u \}$.

\[(3) \text{ For any nonstandard } n \in M, \text{ any finite language } L, \text{ any } L(X) \text{ formula } \Phi(X) \text{ and any } L\text{-structure } A_{W} \in M \text{ with universe } [n] \text{ it holds:}\]

There is $U \subseteq [n], U \in M,$ and $u \in U$ such that the following holds:
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(a) \((A_W, U^{<u}) \models \Phi(U^{<u})\) if and only if \((A_W, U^{\leq u}) \models \Phi(U^{\leq u})\).

(b) For \(t \in U^{<u}\),
\[(A_W, U^{<t}) \models \Phi(U^{<t})\] if and only if \((A_W, U^{\leq t}) \models \neg \Phi(U^{\leq t})\).

Let \(Y(x)\) be a new unary predicate and consider first-order theory \(T_1^\Phi\) in the language \(L(X, Y)\), \(L(X)\) augmented by \(Y\), with axioms:

1. **The least number principle axioms:**
   \[\exists x \alpha(x) \rightarrow \exists y < x (\alpha(x) \land \neg \alpha(y))\]
   for all formulas \(\alpha\) in the language \(L(X, Y)\) (as we will evaluate formulas over a structure with universe \([n]\) they are de facto bounded),

2. \(\exists x \in X (x \in Y) \neq \Phi(X^{\leq x})\),

3. axiom \(\Psi(Y)\), where \(\Psi\) is the formula:
   \[Y \subseteq X \land \min X \in Y \land (\forall y \in X \text{ suc}_X(\min X) = y \rightarrow y \notin Y) \land\]
   \[\forall x, y \in X \text{ suc}_X(\text{suc}_X(x)) = y \rightarrow x \in Y \equiv y \in Y\]
   where for \(x \in X\), \(\text{suc}_X(x)\) is \(\min\{z \in X \mid x < z\}\), if it exists.

**Claim 1:** Statement (3) for a given language \(L\), formula \(\Phi\), set \(U \in M\) and some \(u \in U\) is equivalent to the existence of \(V \subseteq [n]\) (\(V\) not necessarily in \(M\)) such that the expanded structure \((A_W, U, V)\) satisfies \(T_1^\Phi\) (\(U\) interprets \(X\) and \(V\) interprets \(Y\)).

For the only if direction note that for \(U\) and \(u \in U\) satisfying (3) a suitable \(V\) can be defined in \(M\) already: take for \(V\) the subset of \(U\) consisting of its elements on odd positions. Axiom 1. holds because \(M\) satisfies it for all formulas, axiom 3. holds by the definition of \(V\) and axiom 2. holds as it is witnessed by \(x := u\).

For the if direction assume that \((A_W, U, V) \models T_1^\Phi\). Take for \(u\) the minimal \(x\) witnessing axiom 2.; it exists by the least number principle. Utilizing axiom 3. we see that the pair \(U, u\) satisfies statement (3).

**PHP example.** In this example we aim at a proof complexity lower bound. Given \(m \geq 2\), consider a propositional formula \(PHP_m\) formed using atoms \(p_{ij}\), \(i \in [m]\) and \(j \in [m - 1]\) that is the disjunction of the following formulas:

- \(\bigvee_i \bigwedge_j \neg p_{ij}\),
- \(\bigvee_{i \neq i_2} \bigvee_j (p_{ii} \land p_{ij})\),
- \(\bigvee_{j_1 \neq j_2} \bigvee_i (p_{ij_1} \land p_{ij_2})\).
Having a falsifying assignment $p_{ij} := a_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$ we could define the graph of an injective map from $[m]$ to $[m-1]$: 

$$\{(i,j) | a_{ij} = 1\}$$

which is impossible. So $PHP_m$ is a tautology.

The depth of a formula (in DeMorgan language) is the maximal number of connected blocks of alike connectives on a path of subformulas of the formula (the depth of $PHP_m$ is thus 3). A Frege system $F$ is a sound and implicationally complete finite collection of inference rules and axiom schemes. Its depth $d$ subsystem $F_d$ is allowed to use only formulas of depth $\leq d$.

A path in a depth $d$ formula of size (i.e. the number of symbols) $s$ can be naturally determined by a $d$-tuple of numbers $\leq s$, giving $d$ pointers to which subformula the path moves when alternating from one connective to another. This implies that such a formula can be coded by a $d$-ary function on $[s]$ giving information about atoms (or constants) in which individual paths end. Hence an $F_d$ proof of $PHP_n$ of size polynomial in $n$ can be coded by a relation $S$ on $[n]$. The qualification naturally used above means that, given $d$, one can define in $([n], R, S)$ the satisfaction relation between formulas in the proof $S$ and a truth assignment $3^R$.

Using this, and overspill as before, the statement (4) For all $d \geq 3$ and all large enough $m \geq 2$ there is no $F_d$ proof of $PHP_m$ of size $\leq m^d$, is equivalent to the following statement about $M$ and any nonstandard $n \in M$:

(5) for all $d \geq 3$ and any relation $S$ on $[n]$, $S \in M$, $S$ does not encode an $F_d$ proof of $PHP_n$.

Let $L$ be a finite language and let $Z$ be a new symbol for a binary relation. Consider the theory $T_2$:

- Induction axioms for all $L(Z)$-formulas as in $T_1$,
- $\neg PHP(Z)$ axiom: 
  $$[\forall x \exists y < n Z(x,y)] \land [\forall x < x' \forall y < n \neg Z(x,y) \lor \neg Z(x',y)] \land$$
  $$[\forall x \forall y < y' < n \neg Z(x,y) \lor \neg Z(x,y')] .$$

Claim 2: Assume that for any finite $L$ and any $L$-structure $A_W$ with universe $[n]$ (any nonstandard $n \in M$) there exists an expansion $(A_W, R)$ satisfying $T_2$ with $Z := R$. Then statement (5) is true.

To see this assume that (5) fails, i.e. some relation $S$ on $[n]$ encodes an $F_d$-proof of $PHP_n$. Let $(A_W, R)$ be a model of $T_2$, with $W$ containing $S$. Using the truth definition for depth $\leq d$ formulas show that under the assignment $p_{ij} := 1$ if $R(i,j)$ and $p_{ij} := 0$ otherwise all propositional axioms and the formula $\neg PHP_n$ are true. Hence, by induction, there has to be an inference whose all hypotheses are true while its conclusion is not. But that is impossible.

Note that Claim 2 is formulated as an implication and not equivalence as Claim 1; we shall return to this issue in the next section.

3Details left out in this example can be found in [13].
TAUT example. Let $TAUT \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ be the set of propositional tautologies in the DeMorgan language. A propositional proof system (abbreviated to PPS) in the sense of Cook and Reckhow [6] is a polynomial time binary relation $P$ on $\{0,1\}^*$ such that

- $\forall x, y \ (P(x, y) \rightarrow x \in TAUT)$ (soundness),
- $\forall x \in TAUT \ \exists y P(x, y)$ (completeness).

A PPS $P$ is p-bounded if there exists $k \geq 1$ such that the $\exists y$ in the completeness can be bounded by $|y| \leq |x|^k$. A p-bounded PPS exists iff $NP = coNP$, see [6]. The main task is therefore to establish for all PPSs a super-polynomial lengths-of-proofs lower bound. This may be far away at present but lower bounds for specific PPSs have interesting consequences as well (e.g. for independence results or for SAT algorithms).

As before we shall consider strings of length polynomial in $n$ coded by relations on $\mathbb{N}$. For a given PPS $P$ and $k \geq 1$ there exists by Fagin’s theorem a first order formula $\Theta_k(X, Y, Y')$ such that $\exists Y' \Theta_k(X, Y, Y')$ defines on $\mathbb{N}$ the relation $P(x, y)$ and $|y| \leq |x|^k$ for formulas $X \subseteq \mathbb{N}$; $Y$ and $Y'$ are new relation names of arity depending on $P$ and $k$.

Denote by $SAT(Z, X)$ a first order formula defining the satisfaction relation between an assignment $Z \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ and a DNF formula $X \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ (we want to avoid coding of evaluations of general formulas in this discussion). Let $L$ be an arbitrary finite language not containing predicate symbols $X, Z$ and define a theory $T_k^3$ with axioms:

- $\neg SAT(Z, X)$,
- axiom scheme $\Theta_k(\alpha, \beta, \beta') \rightarrow SAT(\gamma, \alpha)$, where $\alpha, \beta, \beta', \gamma$ range over all $L(X, Z)$ formulas.

Claim 3: Assume that for any finite $L$, any $L$-structure $A_W$ with universe $\mathbb{N}$ and any standard $k \geq 1$ there is $F \subseteq \mathbb{N}$, $F \in M$ a DNF formula that is a tautology in $M$, such that $(A_W, F)$ has an expansion $(A_W, F, R)$ satisfying $T_k^3$ with $X := F$ and $Z := R$. Then $P$ is not p-bounded.

If $P$ were p-bounded with exponent $|x|^k$ then by overspill the formula $F$ would have a $P$-proof in $M$ of size polynomial in $n$, and $\Theta_k(F, S, S')$ would hold for some relations $S, S' \in M$ on $\mathbb{N}$ that we can put into $W$. Hence an expansion that is a model of $T_k^3$ for $X := F$ is impossible.

3 Discussion

Claims 2 and 3 can be established as equivalence statements using the theory of propositional translations of $\Pi^1_2$ theories (cf. [13 Chpt.9]). For that argument to work one does not need that $M$ is a model of true arithmetic but only that

(a) $2^{n^t}$ exists in $M$ for some nonstandard $t \leq n$,
(b) $M$ satisfies bounded arithmetic theory $R^1_2$ (which yields forms of collection and comprehension schemes needed for the construction in [13 Sec.9.4]),

4Invoking just Fagin’s theorem here is not enough for various properties one needs often from $\Theta_k$. The formalization needs to be “natural” again. The claim below holds for arbitrary $\Theta_k$ defining the relation, though.
(c) $M$ is countable.

Ajtai [3,4] formulated a general existence theorem for theories $T$ going well beyond first order or $\Pi^1_1$ theories. Such $T$ can be not only second order or third order, etc., but it can be a finite set theory over Ur-elements $[n]$ (and even more), and he allows not only expansions of $A_W$ but expansions of end-extensions of $A_W$. The existence of such a model of $T$ is characterized by the non-existence of a proof of contradiction in $T$ that is - in a specific, rather technical, sense - definable over $A_W$. We refer the reader to Garlik [9] who found a simpler and more conceptual proof of Ajtai’s theorem. The construction needs $M$ satisfying (a)-(c) above and also

(d) $L$ is finite.

In Claims 1 - 3 we stipulated that $L$ is finite in order to avoid the discussion how it is coded. In these claims $L$ can be, in fact, infinite as long as $A_W$ is coded in $M$. But in [3,4,9] the hypothesis (d) is needed.

The intended goal of Claims 1 - 3 is to offer a strategy how to prove a lower bound in complexity theory by constructing a suitable expansion of $A_W$. This has been done by Ajtai [1,2] for the lower bounds explained in Claims 1 and 2. Ajtai [1,2] works in a model of PA but the construction needs only assumptions (a) and (c) above and a variant of (b):

(b') $M$ is a model of the theory PV and of the weak pigeonhole principle for p-time functions (as represented by PV-terms), denoted WPHP(PV).

See [13, Sec.15.2] for how the WPHP(PV) is used.

It is a challenge to construct a suitable model of $T_k^3$ in the situation of Claim 3 for strong PPS $P$ (or even for all PPSs). In an attempt to meet the challenge particular models $M'$ (extending a cut in $M$ of elements with length subexponential in $n$) were constructed in [15,17] and [14] (two different constructions). They were constructed under the assumptions that a one-way permutation exists. These models $M'$ satisfy the following conditions:

1. $2^{2^n}$ exists in $M'$ for some standard $\epsilon > 0$ (this is stronger that (a)),

2. $M'$ is a model of the true $\forall \Pi^1_1$ theory in the language of PV (this does not imply either (b) or (b')). In particular, all PPSs are sound in $M'$.

3. $L$ is infinite and coded in $M'$ but $A_W$ is not coded in $M'$,

4. there is a DNF formula $F \subseteq [n], F \in M$ (the original model of true arithmetic) that has the form:

$$\bigvee_{i \in [n]} \varphi_i(x,y^i)$$

with each $\varphi_i(x,y^i)$ having the form

$$\psi_i(x,y^i) \rightarrow \eta_i(y^i)$$

and such that:
(i) $F$ is a tautology in both $M$ and $M'$,
(ii) $x, y^1, \ldots, y^n$ are mutually disjoint tuples of variables,
(iii) there exists assignments $A \in W$ and $B^i \in W$ for all $i \in [n]$ such that $\varphi_i(A, B^i)$ fails, i.e. $\text{SAT}((A, B^i), \neg \varphi_i)$, and thus $\text{SAT}((A, B^i), \psi_i) \land \text{SAT}(B^i, \neg \eta_i)$, hold in $M'$.

(The reason why (i)-(iii) are not a priori contradictory is that without a collections scheme we have apparently no way to combine assignments $A$ and all $B^i$ together to get an assignment falsifying $F$.)

We now derive more properties of $M'$ using the assumption that a PPS $P$ is p-bounded and sufficiently strong. We shall use the specific form of the formula $F$ used in [14][17]; we will formulate its properties explicitly but the interested reader is assumed to learn the definition of the formula in [14][17] and check that it has the stated properties.

Claim 4: Assume $P$ is p-bounded and sufficiently strong. Then, in $M'$, the following facts hold:

(iv) There is a $P$-proof of $\bigwedge_{i \in [n]} \varphi_i(A, y^i)$ in $M'$ coded by a relation on $[n]$.

(v) for each $i \in [n]$ there are $P$-proofs of $(\psi_i(x, z) \land \psi_i(x, z')) \rightarrow z \equiv z'$ and of $\neg \varphi_i(A, y^i)$ in $M'$ coded by relations on $[n]$.

(vi) formula $\bigwedge_{i \in [n]} \psi_i(A, y^i)$ is not $P$-refutable in $M'$.

Statement (iv) follows from the p-boundedness of $P$ and 2. and (i) above: $F$ has a $P$-proof $\pi$ in $M \cap M'$ and there is a p-time function $f(x, y)$ such that in $M$ $f(a, p)$ is a $P$-proof of $F(a, y^1, \ldots, y^n)$ for all $a$ and all $P$-proofs $p$ of $F$, and hence by 2. $f(A, \pi)$ is the wanted proof. The first part of statement (v) follows again from the p-boundedness of $P$ and the fact that formulas $(\psi_i(x, z) \land \psi_i(x, z')) \rightarrow z \equiv z'$ are tautologies in $M$. It follows that $\psi_i(A, B^i) \rightarrow \psi_i(A, y^i)$ and thus $\psi_i(A, y^i)$ (using that the true sentences $\psi_i(A, B^i)$ have $P$-proofs) and $\neg \varphi_i(B^i)$ have $P$-proofs in $M'$ too. Statement (vi) is valid because of the specific formulas $\psi_i$ have the property that it holds in $M$ that

$$\forall x \exists y = ((y)_1, \ldots, (y)_n) \bigwedge_{i \in [n]} \psi(x, (y)_i).$$

This implies that in $M$ for no $a$ and $k \in \mathbb{N}$ there is a $P$-proof of $\neg \bigwedge_{i \in [n]} \psi_i(a, y^i)$ of size $\leq n^k$, and by p-boundedness of $P$ these facts have $P$-proofs in $M$ (and hence in $M'$) and $P$ is sound in $M'$.

Ideally we would like to bring the existence of $M'$ with properties 1.-4.(with (iv)-(vi) added) to a contradiction. That would imply that the hypothesis of the existence of a one-way permutation used in [14][17] contradicts the hypothesis of p-boundedness of $P$ used in Claim 4, entailing a conditional lower bound for (possibly all) $P$. In light of Claim 4 it seems natural to try to extend model $M'$ by adding a satisfying assignment for $\bigwedge_i \psi(A, y^i)$.

The existence of a satisfying assignment for $\bigwedge_i \psi(A, y^i)$ would follow if $M'$ would satisfy a collection scheme for $\Sigma^1_A$ formulas on $A_W$. But that is unlikely as the argument of Cook and

\footnote{We need that $P$ contains resolution, $P$-proofs of true sentences can be constructed by a p-time algorithm (hence its soundness is true in $M'$), and that $P$ simulates modus ponens and substitutions of constants with only a polynomial increase in the proof length.}
Thapen [7] implies that the true $\forall\Pi^b_1$ theory does not prove the scheme (unless factoring is not hard), and the same argument implies that one cannot argue just using the $\forall\Pi^b_1$ theory of $M'$ that it has an extension where the collection holds (we would also need that it adds no new elements into $[n]$). The construction of $M'$ in [14] depends just on the $\forall\Pi^b_1$ theory of $M$ and hence it is unlikely that it can be used again with the ground model being $M'$.

The use of the property that we add no new elements into $[n]$ in Claims 1 - 3 was solely to preserve the first order theory of $A_W$ (in the preceding paragraph it would also imply that (iii) above remains true in an extension of $M'$). There is an alternative for arranging that. In the forcing from [15, 17] one naturally adds many new elements into $[n]$ (and, in fact, does not include all of $[n]$ from $M$ into $M'$) but the first order theory of $A_W$ is nevertheless often preserved. The set-up of the method presupposes some approximate counting available in the ground model (here $M'$) and the model is assumed to be $\aleph_1$-saturated. The former can be arranged as one can modify the constructions so that the so called dual WPHP for p-time functions, dWPHP(PV), is true in $M'$ too and that yields some approximate counting by Jeřábek [11, 12]. As for the latter condition: some saturation property of $M'$ could be arranged (cf. [16]) if one could modify the forcing construction of $M'$ so that it is defined by a compact family (in the sense of [17]) of random variables. That would be possible if one could establish a hard-core lemma for the computation model underlying the construction. That, together with the fact (see 3. above) that $A_W$ is not coded in $M'$, seem to be the main technical obstacles to apply Claim 3 to a general PPS.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


