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A NOTE ON PROOFS OF FALSEHOOD *

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In these notes we shall sketch a few results motivated by Švejdar's question (see below). To make the paper self-contained we repeat, in Chapter 0, definitions of some notions and some results (without proofs) used in it. For more details the reader can consult e.g. [Pu].

Chapter 0

Let us begin with an informal recall of a few familiar notions. Q is *Robinson's arithmetic*, a *bounded formula* (or Δ_0) is a formula in the language of Q whose quantifiers are of the form $\exists x < t$ or $\forall x < t$ (t term not containing x), and *bounded arithmetic* $I\Delta_0$ is the extension of Q by instances of the induction scheme for all bounded formulas. Exp is the Π_2^0 formula in the language of Q saying “ $\forall x \exists y : y = 2^x$ ”.

A *cut in a theory* T is any formula $I(x)$, s.t. T proves the conjunction of the conditions: (i) $I(0)$, (ii) $I(x) \rightarrow I(s(x))$, (iii) $I(x) \& y < x \rightarrow I(y)$. We say that the cut is closed under the addition (resp. multiplication) iff T proves also: (iv) $I(x) \& I(y) \rightarrow I(x + y)$ (resp. $I(x) \& I(y) \rightarrow I(x \cdot y)$).

A theory T is called *sequential* iff it contains a reasonable fragment of a theory of finite sequences – for definitions and examples see [Pu]. Sequential theories and cuts in theories play an important role in the questions of interpretability (cf. [Pu]).

The last informal definition is: the *depth of a proof* is the maximal logical depth (not length) of a formula in it, where the logical depth is defined as usual.

We continue stating a few more formal definitions and recalling some results concerning the notions above. For proofs or details consult the cited papers.

Definition:

- (1) a) $\text{Con}_y^{I(x)}(T) \Leftrightarrow$ “there is no proof d of $0 = 1$ in T s.t. $I(d)$ and d has the depth $\leq y$ ”
b) $\text{Con}^I(T) \Leftrightarrow \forall y; \text{Con}_y^I(T)$
c) $\text{Con}_y(T) \Leftrightarrow \text{Con}_y^{x=x}(T)$
d) $\text{Con}(T) \Leftrightarrow \forall y; \text{Con}_y(T)$

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- (2) a) $\text{HCon}^I(T) \Leftrightarrow$ “for any t , s.t. $I(t)$, t does not satisfy both (i) and (ii):
(i) t is a propositional tautology
(ii) t is a disjunction of Herbrand variants of a prenex normal form of a disjunction of negations of some axioms of T (cf. [Pu])”
b) $\text{HCon}(T) \Leftrightarrow \text{HCon}^{x=x}(T)$
(3) $T \leqq S$ iff T is globally interpretable in S
(4) $T \models^m A$ iff formula A has a proof in T of depth $\leqq m$

Fact 0.0 (P. Pudlák): *For a reasonable sequential theory T and for any cut $I(x)$ in T :*

- (i) $T \vdash \text{Con}^I(T)$
and even
(ii) *there exists $k < \omega$, $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_k^I(T)$.*

Fact 0.1 (P. Pudlák): *Let T be a finitely axiomatizable, sequential theory or $T = I\Delta_0$. Then there exists a cut $H(x)$ in T s.t.: $T \vdash \text{HCon}^H(T)$.*

Fact 0.2 (P. Pudlák): *For T a finitely axiomatizable, sequential theory or for $T = I\Delta_0$: not $Q + \{\text{Con}_k(T) \mid k < \omega\} \leqq T$.*

Fact 0.3 (A. Wilkie): *Let M be a countable model of $I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp}$, $I(x)$ any formula of depth $\leqq k$ which is a cut in $I\Delta_0$ and have terms of depth $\leqq 1$. Let $a, b \in M$ be two nonstandard elements of M s.t.: $M \models 2_{(2 \cdot k+3)}^a \leqq b$. Then there exists an initial substructure $M' \subseteq_e M$ s.t.:*

- (i) $M' \models I\Delta_0$
(ii) $a \in M'$, $b \notin M'$
(iii) $M' \models I(a)$.
(2_x^y is the function defined: $2_0^y = y$ and $2_{x+1}^y = 2^{(2_x^y)}$.)

The results of this note are inspired by Švejdar's question: “When is it consistent for inconsistency-proofs to lie between cuts?” (the question is inspired by 0.0(i)). More precisely; for which T , $I(x)$ and $J(x)$ cuts in T is the theory “ $T + \text{Con}^I(T) + \neg \text{Con}^J(T)$ ” consistent?

The arguments are sometimes only sketched and the paper should be considered as a preliminary report.

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Chapter 1

For making results and arguments more readable let us extend the languages of the theories under consideration by constants e, e_0, e_1, \dots with the meaning:

- (i) e is the least proof of $0=1$ in T or $e=0$ if $\text{Con}(T)$
(ii) e_k is the least proof of $0=1$ in T of depth $\leqq k$ or $e_k=0$ if $\text{Con}_k(T)$.

Proposition 1.0: For any cut $I(x)$ in $I\Delta_0$ there exists natural k s.t.

$$I\Delta_0 \not\vdash I(e) \rightarrow I(2_k^e).$$

Proof: Let $M \models I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp} + \neg \text{Con}(I\Delta_0)$ be countable (it is known that $I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp} \not\models \text{Con}(I\Delta_0)$ – see [P-W]).

By 0.3 there exists $M' \subseteq_e M$ s.t.:

- (i) $e \in M'$ but $2_k^e \notin M'$,
- (ii) $M' \models I(e)$,
- (iii) $M' \models I\Delta_0$.

It is enough to choose $k = 2 \cdot \text{"the depth of cut } I \text{ when written using terms of the depth } \leq 1" + 3$. We have done. q.e.d.

Proposition 1.1. For any cut $I(x)$ in theory T , where T is a finitely axiomatizable, sequential Π_1^0 theory or $T = I\Delta_0$, there exist natural k, m s.t.:

$$T \not\vdash I(e_k) \rightarrow I(2_m^{(e_k)}).$$

Proof. According to 0.1 we can define a cut $H_0(x)$ in T closed under multiplication s.t.:

$$T \vdash \text{HCon}^{H_0}(T)$$

Define a cut $H(x)$:

$$H(x) \equiv [(\text{HCon}(T) \wedge x = x) \vee (\neg \text{HCon}(T) \wedge H_0(x))]$$

Clearly:

$$T \vdash \text{HCon}^H(T).$$

Assume that for all $k < \omega$ the theory “ $T + I \subseteq H + \neg \text{Con}_k^I(T)$ ” is inconsistent, i.e.

$$(1) \quad T + I \subseteq H \vdash \text{Con}_k^I(T), \quad k < \omega.$$

Since evidently:

$$(2) \quad T + I \subseteq H \leq T$$

(relativize to the cut $H(x)$; here $T \vdash H^H = H$ is needed, but this is easily verifiable) also:

$$(3) \quad T + \{\text{Con}_k^I(T) | k < \omega\} \leq T.$$

Now:

$$(4) \quad Q + \{\text{Con}_k(T) | k < \omega\} \leq T + \{\text{Con}_k^I(T) | k < \omega\}$$

(relativize to $I(x)$ or to a suitable shortening of $I(x)$ if it is not closed under multiplication).

From (3) and (4):

$$Q + \{\text{Con}_k(T) | k < \omega\} \leq T,$$

which is a contradiction with 0.2.

Hence, since (1) is false there exists $k < \omega$ s.t.:

$$T + I \subseteq H + \neg \text{Con}_k^I(T)$$

is consistent.

From Herbrand's theorem it is known how to transform a proof d of $0 = 1$ of depth $\leq k$ into a Herbrand's disjunction of size $\leq 2^d$, m polynomially depending on k , contradicting a given theory (in the sense of Definition (2)).

If it were true that:

$$T \vdash I(e_k) \rightarrow I(2_m^{(e_k)}),$$

we would also have:

$$(5) \quad "T + e_k \neq 0 + H(2_m^{(e_k)})" \text{ is consistent.}$$

But this is in a contradiction with the choice of the cut $H(x)$. q.e.d.

Remark: When speaking about T as a Π_1^0 -theory we implicitly assume that T is in the language of arithmetic. The assumption that T is Π_1^0 implies that in models of T the axioms of T are also satisfied in all initial segments closed under multiplication. An example: any theory of the form $(Q + A)$, A a true Π_1^0 -sentence, is a finitely axiomatizable, sequential Π_1^0 -theory.

Chapter 2

Now we shall use the preceding chapter to obtain some results related to Švejdar's question.

Theorem 2.0: *For any cut $I(x)$ in $I\Delta_0$ there exists $k < \omega$ s.t. for any cut $J(x)$ in $I\Delta_0$ satisfying:*

$$I\Delta_0 \vdash J(x) \rightarrow I(2_k^x)$$

the theory

$$I\Delta_0 + \text{Con}^J(I\Delta_0) + \neg \text{Con}^I(I\Delta_0)$$

is consistent.

Proof: Let k be the natural number assigned to $I(x)$ by Proposition 1.0. Assume that " $I\Delta_0 + \text{Con}^J(I\Delta_0) + \neg \text{Con}^I(I\Delta_0)$ " is inconsistent, i.e.:

$$I\Delta_0 \vdash I(e) \rightarrow J(e)$$

By the hypothesis of the theorem:

$$I\Delta_0 \vdash J(e) \rightarrow I(2_k^e)$$

and thus:

$$I\Delta_0 \vdash I(x) \rightarrow I(2_k^x)$$

This contradicts the choice of k . q.e.d.

Theorem 2.1: For any cut $I(x)$ in T , where T is finitely axiomatizable, sequential Π_1^0 -theory or $T = I\Delta_0$, there exist $k, m < \omega$ s.t. if a cut $J(x)$ in T satisfies:

$$T \vdash J(x) \rightarrow I(2_m^x)$$

then the theory.

$$T + \text{Con}_k^I(T) + \neg \text{Con}_k^I(T)$$

is consistent.

Proof: Similar to the proof of 2.0 using 1.1 instead of 1.0. q.e.d.

The following observation complements the preceding two results.

Proposition 2.2.: For any cut $I(x)$ in a finitely axiomatizable, sequential Π_1^0 -theory T or in $T = I\Delta_0$ there exists a cut $J(x)$ in T s.t.:

- (i) $T \vdash J(x) \rightarrow I(x)$
- (ii) $T \nvdash I(x) \rightarrow J(x)$
- but
 (iii) $T + \text{Con}^I(T) + \neg \text{Con}^I(T)$ is not consistent (and analogously when using Con_k 's instead of Con).

Proof: With $I(x)$ given define:

$$J(x) \leftrightarrow (I(x) \& (\text{Con}(T) \rightarrow (\forall y; I(y) \rightarrow I(y + 2^x))))$$

Evidently:

- (i) $T \vdash "J \text{ is a cut}"$
- (ii) $T \vdash J(x) \rightarrow I(x)$
- (iii) $T \vdash \neg \text{Con}^I(T) \rightarrow \neg \text{Con}^I(T)$, since
 $T \vdash \neg \text{Con}^I(T) \rightarrow I = J$.

It remains to show (ii) of the proposition. Assume the contrary

$$(1) \quad T \vdash I(x) \rightarrow J(x).$$

Then:

$$(2) \quad T + \text{Con}(T) \vdash I(x) \rightarrow I(2^x).$$

According to [P-D] there exists a model $M \models \text{PA} + \text{Con } T$ and an initial substructure $P \subseteq_e M$ s.t. in the structure $\langle M, P \rangle$ there is no definable a cut in P closed under 2^x . Choose such $\langle M, P \rangle$. Since $I\Delta_0 \subseteq \text{PA}$ and $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Con}(T) \rightarrow T$ for T a Π_1^0 finite theory we have: $P \models T + \text{Con } T$.

Bv (2) then: $P \models I(x) \rightarrow I(2^x)$. A contradiction. q.e.d.

Chapter 3

The aim of this chapter is to prove the following result.

Theorem 3.0: *For $T = I\Delta_0$ or T a finitely axiomatizable, sequential theory there exists an assignment of natural numbers to cuts in T , say $I \mapsto k_I$, s.t. the theory:*

$$T + \{\neg \text{Con}_{k_I}^I \mid I \text{ cut in } T\}$$

is consistent.

Observe that since for all $k < \omega$ there is a cut I in T s.t. $T \vdash \text{Con}_k^I(T)$ the theorem is equivalent with the proposition: “there is a model $M \models T$ s.t. e_i ’s are cofinal in all definable cuts (i.e. for each I a cut in T there exists e_i s.t. $M \models (I(e_i) \& e_i \neq 0)$ and $e \neq 0$ lies in all these cuts.”

We shall need the following result proved in [F] (it can be also obtained from [Pu]).

Fact 3.1 (H. Friedman): *Let S, T be finitely axiomatizable, sequential theories. Then the following are equivalent:*

- (i) $S \leqq T$
- (ii) $I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp} \vdash \text{HCon}(T) \rightarrow \text{HCon}(S)$.
(This formulation is closer to [Pu]).

Another result we shall use is the “effective” version of 0.0(ii), namely:

Fact 3.2 (P. Pudlák): *Let T be a finitely axiomatizable, sequential theory. Then for any cut $I(x)$ in T there exists $k < \omega$ s.t.:*

$$I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp} \vdash \text{HCon}(T) \rightarrow \text{HCon}(T + \neg \text{Con}_k^I(T))$$

(3.2 is obtained by an inspection of the proof of 0.0(ii)).

Finally we shall need:

Fact 3.3 (P. Pudlák): *$I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp}$ proves: “Let S, T be sequential theories, $S \leqq T$ and i be some interpretation of S in T . Then there exist cuts $I(x)$ in T and $J(x)$ in S s.t. there is a (definable) isomorphisms between $\langle I(x), +, \cdot \rangle$ and $\langle J(x)^i, +^i, \cdot^i \rangle$ (the structures definable in T)”.*

(3.3 is proved in [Pu], while its $I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp}$ -provability is easily verifiable).

Proof of the Theorem 3.0: Let J_0, J_1, \dots enumerate all cuts in T and define cuts I_0, I_1, \dots :

$$I_n(X) \Leftrightarrow J_n(x) \& \dots \& J_n(x)$$

So we have:

- (i) $T \vdash I_0 \supseteq I_1 \supseteq \dots$ and
- (ii) for any cut J in T there is $k < \omega$ s.t.

$$T \vdash J \supseteq I_k$$

T is from now on assumed to be finite.

Step 1: By 3.2 there exists $k_0 < \omega$ s.t.

$$I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp} \vdash \text{HCon}(T) \rightarrow \text{HCon}(T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_0}^{I_0}(T)).$$

Hence by 3.1:

$$T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_0}^{I_0}(T) \leq T$$

(and this is provable in $I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp}$ since it is true Σ_1^0 -sentence) and let i_0 be the interpretation.

Step 2: Take a cut $I_1(x)$. We claim that there is $k_1 < \omega$ s.t.

$$I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp} \vdash \text{HCon}(T) \rightarrow \text{HCon}(T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_0}^{I_0}(T) + \neg \text{Con}_{k_1}^{I_1}(T)).$$

Firstly argue informally: assume that we choose k_1 sufficiently big and that:

$$\neg \text{HCon}(T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_0}^{I_0}(T) + \neg \text{Con}_{k_1}^{I_1}(T)).$$

Then there is $m < \omega$ s.t.:

$$T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_0}^{I_0}(T) \Vdash^m \neg \text{Con}_{k_1}^{I_1}(T).$$

Using the interpretation i_0 we can construct, by 3.3, a cut $I'_1(x)$ in T and m' s.t.:

$$T \Vdash^{m'} \neg \text{Con}_{k_1}^{I'_1}(T).$$

(roughly speaking: I'_1 is the image of I_1 in the interpretation i_0 intersected with the initial part of numbers common to the universe and to the universe of the interpretation), i.e.:

$$\neg \text{Con}_{m''}(T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_1}^{I'_1}(T)), \quad \text{for some } m'' \geq m$$

From this it follows that:

$$\neg \text{HCon}(T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_1}^{I'_1}(T)).$$

If we choose k_1 sufficiently large w.r.t. $I'_1(x)$ we have, by 3.2.:

Hence we proved: $\neg \text{HCon}(T)$.

$$\text{HCon}(T) \rightarrow \text{HCon}(T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_0}^{I_0}(T) + \neg \text{Con}_{k_1}^{I_1}(T)).$$

Now, the whole argument of Step 2 can be formalized and proved in $I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp}$. For this we need only 3.2, 3.3 and the observations:

(1) for all m greater than the depth of A :

$$I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp} \vdash \text{HCon}(A) \equiv \text{Con}_m(A).$$

(2) if $S \leqq T$ is true and i is the interpretation then

$$I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp} \vdash "S \leqq T \text{ and } i \text{ is the interpretation}".$$

So finally we have:

$$I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp} \vdash \text{HCon}(T) \rightarrow \text{HCon}(T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_0}^{I_0}(T) + \neg \text{Con}_{k_1}^{I_1}(T))$$

and, by 3.1.: $T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_0}^{I_0}(T) + \neg \text{Con}_{k_1}^{I_1}(T) \leqq T$.

In the same manner we prove, in the Step($n+1$), the formula:

$$T + \neg \text{Con}_{k_0}^{I_0}(T) + \dots + \neg \text{Con}_{k_n}^{I_n}(T) \leqq T$$

(k_n 's being constructed through the proof). By compactness we obtain consistency of the theory $T + \{\neg \text{Con}_{k_j}^{I_j}(T) \mid j < \omega\}$ and we have done.

The result for $T = I\Delta_0$ is derived as follows. There is a finite, sequential $S \subseteq I\Delta_0$ and a cut $J(x)$ in S s.t. $S \vdash (I\Delta_0)^J$ (see [Pu]). Let M be a model of the theory $S + \{\neg \text{Con}_{k_j}^{I_j}(S) \mid j < \omega\}$ assured above. If we define the initial segment K of M :

$$K = \{m \in M \mid M \models J(m)\},$$

then clearly $K \models I\Delta_0$.

Moreover, if $I(x)$ is a cut in $I\Delta_0$ then for some $m < \omega$: $K \models \neg \text{Con}_m^I(I\Delta_0)$. This is because for some $I_j(x)$ a cut in S , $S \vdash I_j \subseteq I(x)^J$, i.e.

$$\{m \in M \mid M \models I_j(m)\} \subseteq \{m \in K \mid K \models I(m)\}$$

and any proof in S (in particular of $0 = 1$ – we have $M \models \neg \text{Con}_{k_j}^{I_j}(S)$) is a proof in $I\Delta_0$, too. We have done. q.e.d.

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